For others however, organ markets are so obviously ethically and morally questionable that these ‘non-economic’ concerns override their otherwise vigorous support for market solutions.
One purely practical consideration is whether markets for organs will fulfil their promise of increasing supply at all, especially from living donors. Will the ‘intrinsic’ motive of one’s moral commitment be crowded-out by the ‘extrinsic’ incentive of financial compensation?
The crowding-out hypothesis is supported by evidence of reduced blood donations in areas that pay for blood compared to those that don’t. In a classic study on conflicting motivations between financial incentives and social incentives, the introduction of a fine for late pick-ups at a selection of Israeli day-care centres actually increased the number of late pickups. The social motive to do the right thing by the centre was replaced with a financial relationship, where the fine became a fee for longer day care.
Medical professionals are much more cautious in their approach to organ markets. This survey of 739 individuals from the transplant-related medical community found that while 70% support indirect compensation for organ donation, 66% opposed direct compensation, while 84% approved of the role of next-of-kin in this decision. Other studies have found that 85% of families of donors reject any payment at all. Clearly there is more to the story that financial incentives.
I offer here a more standard economic reason why most estimates of increased organ supply from establishing a market for organs, especially by live donors, are massively overestimated. Typically organs are treated as commodities in the abstract sense used by neoclassical models of demand and supply. But in reality, organ donation is a once off irreversible and costly event for each individual, and therefore has the characteristics of a real options problem.
Potential donors have a real option to delay donation for a better price in the future. Yep, the same constraint that determines the rate of housing development occurs in this situation, where donors face decision of when to exercise their one-shot option to donate.
If the price of organs is rising rapidly, it will pay for potential donors to withhold their organs till a future time. Perhaps ultimately till their death, at which time they may exercise their option and bequeath the earnings to their heirs. Or they may not, since there is no financial motivation any longer (apart from bequeath motives, which are actually similar to the ‘intrinsic’ motives discussed earlier).
How such financial dynamics will effect the market for organs (including from live donors) is a concern for policy makers seeking stable reliable supply. There is clearly scope for organ price bubbles to occur, which will compromise the medical intentions of the policy in the first place.
Attempted legal markets for organs are generally compromised by unscrupulous behaviour and high levels of donations by the poorest in society, meaning potential organ donation success typically comes with associated social costs.
Non-market organ donation policies have proven to have great benefits. Setting the national default to opt-in to organ donation, rather than opt-out, seems to generate significant (usually 20-30%) increases in donations, although raising its own moral and ethical dilemmas.
My personal view is that the default option appears worthwhile and should be on the table for public discussion. But the moral controversy surrounding organ donation seems to suggest that developments in lab-grown organs will be a more attractive, potentially medically and morally. This a complex area of social policy and I am no expert. Simply offer yet another argument to quell the enthusiasm of the market zealots, and point interested readers to the variety of challenges, both moral and practical, in this area of policy.